Airpower During the Second Lebanon War

Sorry for not posting a more significant article, but I spent 10 hours on the road today. So not to leave today empty I will provide you with initial questions I plan to answer for my second intelligence analysis series, "Airpower During the Second Lebanon War: Israel's Air Superiority and Future Implication." I would like to invite you to comment with any questions you might like to see answered in this analysis. All I ask is that you have the questions posted within a two week period before the projected date of Spetember 20, 2009.

Questions:

IDF Use of Airpower

What information was available to the IDF before the 2006 kidnappings ?
Was the information better about long-range missiles compared to short-range rockets?
If so Why?
Why did airpower fail for Israel during this war?
What did the IDF learn from the Second Lebanon War?
What was Israel's avg./expected kill chain?
How many missiles could be salvoed in this time?
Total number of rockets Israel destroyed?

Hezbollah Denial

How was Hezbollah able to fortify and dig out bunkers?
How was Hezbollah able to continue salvoing missiles?
Where did their resupply come from?
Who was resupplying Hezbollah and what were they supplying them with?
What routes were taken for resupply?
Why were Hezbollah's long-range missiles so vulnerable to Israeli intelligence?
What did Hezbollah learn from the Second Lebanon War?
How will Hezbollah likely adapt?
What was the average number of Hezbollah missile salvos during the second Lebanon war?
Total number of rockets fired by Hezbollah?