Tuesday, August 18, 2009

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism VI

War Lords and Terrorists at the Center of the Cycle:

Today, over 100 countries are participating in the Global War on Terrorism. The majority of their actions focus on closing down financial networks of organizations deemed to be terrorist in nature. “This crackdown in terrorist financing has led some terrorists to transform their organizations by creating ‘in house’ criminal capabilities in order to generate revenue” (Sanderson 2004). Terrorist organizations are now seeking creative ways to raise money. The drug trade is an obvious choice as many terrorist organizations are already involved with the black market weapons trade.

While Hezbollah has been involved with methamphetamine labs and cigarette smuggling in the United States and Canada, al Qaeda has well-developed connections with criminal syndicates in central Asia that include Pakistani and Afghani opium traffickers (Sanderson 2004).

These networks are extremely harmful to the United States public as well as Europeans. Al Qaeda could coerce Afghan farmers to grow even more poppy in the coming years. This would be detrimental to the war on terrorism. Terrorist organizations are in dire need of funding for their activities and drug money allows them the ability to gain funds by the millions of dollars.

Warlords and drug traffickers are coercing farmers into growing more poppy than normal. Warlords make billions of dollars yearly from poppy production. “The 2006 harvest was valued at 3.1 billion dollars, nearly a third of Afghanistan’s total national product including both legal and illegal activities…” (Milliken 2007). Ninety percent of heroin produced in Afghanistan is funneled to the West. The majority of the drugs end up in Europe and Russia, but some of the supply can be found in the United States. The trail of money is easy to follow throughout a simple flow chart. Drug lords, forcefully coerce or provide cash to farmers who grow poppy. As poppy production increases, a larger supply of heroin is created. The Heroin is then distributed and consumed in the West. Finally narco-dollars end up back in the pockets of tribal war lords, which allows them to maintain control of their region.

While there is corruption in the Afghan government, legitimate military sources are using the Afghan drug trade to not only fund operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda but also to fund global Jihad in Kashmir.

It is widely believed that profits from the drug trade provide the Pakistani intelligence agencies (notably the Inter-Services Intelligence Unit, or ISI) with vast sums of money with which to finance the war in Afghanistan and to continue operations in Kashmir and elsewhere. As a result, the ISI has greatly increased the role it plays among a wide variety of groups, from Afghan refugees in the northwest frontier region to Islamist political parties in Pakistan proper and the mujahideen themselves-who, over the years, have sold, bartered, and stashed away large quantities of weapons and narcotics (Kartha)

Pakistani intelligence services fund their operations through narcotics sales in the West. They are able to generate large amounts of revenue that not only fund these legitimate actions but fund global Jihad in the conflict between India and Pakistan over the area of Kashmir. Afghan war lords and terrorist organizations also profit economically from Western consumption of Heroin.

Economic Flow Char

Post 9/11, the United States and Coalition forces have used warlords to isolate and eliminate al Qaeda. However, using these warlords to the advantage of military forces in the country carries a heavy price.

Tribal warlords use the proceeds from poppy production within their area of control to…maintain their power base through weapons acquisitions. Similarly, remnants of the Taliban are using their drug profits to acquire weapons and attempt to reestablish power in the southern regions of Afghanistan. They are also using opium as a means to retaliate against the Untied States (Hueg 2004).

Afghan war lords, Taliban members, and al Qaeda acquire weapons through an extensive black market trade in the Southeast Asian region. Afghanistan is feeding the global illicit arms trade in the region because it continually draws in more weapons and mujahidin (holy warriors or fighters) than its neighboring countries. Narcotics production in Afghanistan leads to the “so-called weapons and drugs-nexus” (Kartha). Regional war lords maintain their power through coercion and force. Afghan farmers (as stated above) are, sometimes, forced to grow poppy by war lords. In turn war lords fund their weapons caches through drug money provided to them through global drug dealers. Large weapons caches and a seemingly endless supply of cash enable these regional powerhouses to maintain their power grip causing instability in Afghanistan and throughout the world. Weapons and cash also allow war lords to recruit other mujahidin. They are able to pay them competitive wages to protect the areas that they control. Weapons and finances could enable warlords to advance their power grip outside their region. This could result in regional conflicts between opposing tribal leaders, as well as a global conflict with neighboring countries and terrorist actions. Tribal war lords not only maintain power through coercive force but through bribing leaders throughout all levels of government.

Afghan government officials, throughout all levels of government, are contributing to the drug trade through taking bribes. High ranking government officials are thought to be participating in drug trafficking. At the very least the bribes are causing them to turn a blind eye to what is happening in their region. “Western aid officials and several European diplomats named the same high-ranking politicians and officials, including one with close links to Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President, as drug lords” (Harnden 2006). Simply turning a blind eye to the drug trade in Afghanistan would be an underestimate of what is actually happening throughout the spectrum. In reality, several officials are actually drug traffickers themselves. They provide the logistics for their staff to carry out narcotics trafficking throughout Afghanistan.

Abdul Karim Brahowie, Afghanistan's minister of tribal and frontier affairs, says that the government has become so full of drug smugglers that cabinet meetings have become a farce. "Sometimes the people who complain the loudest about theft are thieves themselves," he says (Baldauf and Bowers 2005).

While there are provincial leaders who are legitimately cracking down on poppy production some are only conducting anti-narcotics operations to line their own pockets. It makes logical sense to put your competitor out of business. The fewer people competing for poppy supply, the more money an individual will make. While this may eliminate a substantial amount of drug traffickers from the region, it does not eliminate the supply of heroin introduced to the global drug market.

Corruption in the government, due to narco-dollars, has limited the eradication effort within Afghanistan. Provincial leaders receiving millions of dollars yearly have no reason to stamp out poppy production. They also have no reason to provide Afghan farmers with economic incentives to grow alternative crops. Corrupt leaders fuel the global heroin market because it creates a demand for poppy production. The full outline of this section is outlined in chart number three in the appendix in order to understand the section revolving around the drug lords and terrorist groups. The next section will revolve around engagement by the United States Military and NATO forces.

Warlords and Terrorists Flow
Sources:

Sanderson, Thomas N. 2004. “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines.” SAIS Review XXIV(1).
Milliken David. 2007. Washington (AFP).
Kartha, Tara, “Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arms in South Asia.”
Lt. Col. Hueg, Thomas H. 2004. “Afghanistan and Opium: Breaking the Habit.” U.S. Army War College.
Baldauf, Scott, and Faye Bowers. 2007. “Afghanistan Riddled With Drug Ties.” The Christian Science Monitor.
Harnden, Tobel. 2006. “Drug Trade ‘Reaches to Afghan Cabinet.’” Telegraph United Kingdom.

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