The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism VIII

Global Consequences:

If the United States does not begin to reign in war lords making money from illicit drug trade, the US will suffer consequences much like the consequences it has suffered from al Qaeda over the last decade. Tribal war lords will be heavily armed with advanced weapons and a network of mujahidin that potentially could have a global reach. At the very least the mujahidin, if felt threatened by the United States, could prolong the war against terrorism in South East Asia. Providing more forces to Afghanistan may spread the United States Military too thin and hinder the Global War on Terrorism. Drug money leading to the funding of al Qaeda may enable terrorists around the world new capabilities to conduct their operations.

The United States may be empowering groups that could carry out future Jihad against the United States. Our previous experience in Afghanistan helped enable Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization commit the atrocities of 9/11 and other attacks against the United States. The Karzai government will also have this ability once the Afghan military is powerful enough to take out these warlords. Not only is this causing destabilization in Afghanistan it could cause terrorism in the future.

US’ dependence on the warlords and their militias to further its political and military agenda has been detrimental to the disarmament and the weaponisation programme; creation of a national army and the police force; anti narcotics operations and, above all, building institutions of governance and extending Kabul’s authority in the provinces (Chandra 2006).

The United States must break away from the idea that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. While Afghan warlords are playing an essential role in reigning in al Qaeda members, the United States and the people of Afghanistan can not afford these people to turn on them once their means to collect funds is taken away. The United States pulled funds from earlier Mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan which was one of the reasons Osama bin Laden created al Qaeda. Tribal warlords are already armed to fight an insurgency; they may enable the organizations to morph into terrorist organizations. The same ramifications may arise if the United States and other forces are able to eliminate the drug trade in Afghanistan

Unfortunately, the United States has let the drug trade in Afghanistan spiral out of control to the point that tribal war lords and their Mujahidin have the capability of creating an insurgency against the United States. War lords in Afghanistan possess weapons similar to those being found in Iraq. The use of IED’s, Shape Charges, and anti aircraft weaponry has wreaked havoc on Coalition Forces in Baghdad and elsewhere around Iraq. Modeling their insurgency after Iraq would cause difficulties for United States forces in the region. This would cause the US, NATO, and a newly formed coalition to allocate more resources to the region spreading their militaries thin. A weak United States military would not only embolden global terrorist organizations, but also states seeking regional dominance and destabilization.

A weak United States military would embolden Iran to further its nuclear armament program. A nuclear Iran would destabilize the whole Middle East which may cause conflict with Israel or surrounding Arab countries. Further nuclear programs may pop up throughout the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These two countries are current power brokers, along with Iran, in the Middle East and want to maintain their dominance of the region. Israel has said it will not accept a nuclear armed Iran. Further military action carried out by Israel may further destabilize the Middle East causing retaliation by Hizbullah and HAMAS both terrorist organizations funded by Iran. This could possibly lead to a full occupation of the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. This may lead to a further weakening of the West which would embolden al Qaeda and its affiliates.

Al Qaeda is reaping financial benefits from the drug trade in Afghanistan; if current trends continue, their organization may witness a weaker America more susceptible to attack. Al Qaeda is not only weakening the people of the United States by providing them dangerous drugs, but also destabilizing the military through the drug trade. If al Qaeda is successful at destabilizing military forces in the United States, they will have the capability to attack the United States more easily than currently.

The United States must find a way to eliminate poppy production in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the dynamics of the Middle East and South East Asia will change dramatically. However, procedures can be taken to reduce Afghan poppy production. These recommendations must be implemented immediately. Soon Afghanistan will resemble Columbia but with drastically greater consequences.

Sources:

Chandra, VIshal. 2006. “Warlords, Drugs and the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan: The Paradoxes.” Strategic Analysis 30(1).

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism VII

United States and NATO Forces at the Center of the Cycle:

The United States military and NATO forces are at the center of another cycle that is permitting the war lords to achieve power in Afghanistan. While achieving stability is the job of coalition forces in Afghanistan they are actually promoting the opposite. By empowering regional war lords, they are weakening the reach of the Karzai government. On the contrary, regional war lords have been successful at eliminating the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. However, this is a driving factor in the amount of poppy that is produced in these Afghan tribal regions.

NATO forces are currently taking a two pronged approach to eliminating al Qaeda in Afghanistan. First, they are engaging terrorists militarily through their own missions in accordance with the Afghan National Army. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan has produced the arrest of thousands of terrorists and has unfolded an unknown number of terrorist plots. Second, coalition forces are using tribal war lords to fight al Qaeda in their provincial regions. The war lords have been quite successful at eliminating al Qaeda. “Special operations forces work closely with the [warlords] to coordinate OEF air and fire support, conduct tactical training, and provide advice when required” (Maloney 2004). Tribal warlords know their region, and more importantly the people living in that region, well. They are more capable of gathering information from locals and locating individuals suspected of terrorism. Through NATO support the warlords are able to maintain power which provides for greater poppy production in Afghanistan.

Tribal warlords feel empowered by NATO’s willingness to use them as an ally in the Global War on Terrorism. This type of empowerment enables warlords to encourage and even coerce Afghan farmers to grow poppy. As stated earlier, warlords need cash to ensure their ability to purchase weapons on the black market. The United States, NATO, and Coalition Forces are directly feeding the Afghan drug trade through their alliance with the war lords.

Poppy grown in Afghanistan is distributed to the West and poisons the people who abuse it. However, the amount of money made by tribal warlords is estimated to be around three billion dollars annually. This money goes to weapons and is also re-invested in the drug trade. Like any business, you treat it with respect, which means re-investment in the proven methods which work. Because of this cycle; if the United States military and NATO forces do not engage tribal warlords Afghanistan will soon become a narco-state that will result in extreme global consequences.

NATO and U

Sources:

Maloney, Sean M. (2004). “Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?”

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism VI

War Lords and Terrorists at the Center of the Cycle:

Today, over 100 countries are participating in the Global War on Terrorism. The majority of their actions focus on closing down financial networks of organizations deemed to be terrorist in nature. “This crackdown in terrorist financing has led some terrorists to transform their organizations by creating ‘in house’ criminal capabilities in order to generate revenue” (Sanderson 2004). Terrorist organizations are now seeking creative ways to raise money. The drug trade is an obvious choice as many terrorist organizations are already involved with the black market weapons trade.

While Hezbollah has been involved with methamphetamine labs and cigarette smuggling in the United States and Canada, al Qaeda has well-developed connections with criminal syndicates in central Asia that include Pakistani and Afghani opium traffickers (Sanderson 2004).

These networks are extremely harmful to the United States public as well as Europeans. Al Qaeda could coerce Afghan farmers to grow even more poppy in the coming years. This would be detrimental to the war on terrorism. Terrorist organizations are in dire need of funding for their activities and drug money allows them the ability to gain funds by the millions of dollars.

Warlords and drug traffickers are coercing farmers into growing more poppy than normal. Warlords make billions of dollars yearly from poppy production. “The 2006 harvest was valued at 3.1 billion dollars, nearly a third of Afghanistan’s total national product including both legal and illegal activities…” (Milliken 2007). Ninety percent of heroin produced in Afghanistan is funneled to the West. The majority of the drugs end up in Europe and Russia, but some of the supply can be found in the United States. The trail of money is easy to follow throughout a simple flow chart. Drug lords, forcefully coerce or provide cash to farmers who grow poppy. As poppy production increases, a larger supply of heroin is created. The Heroin is then distributed and consumed in the West. Finally narco-dollars end up back in the pockets of tribal war lords, which allows them to maintain control of their region.

While there is corruption in the Afghan government, legitimate military sources are using the Afghan drug trade to not only fund operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda but also to fund global Jihad in Kashmir.

It is widely believed that profits from the drug trade provide the Pakistani intelligence agencies (notably the Inter-Services Intelligence Unit, or ISI) with vast sums of money with which to finance the war in Afghanistan and to continue operations in Kashmir and elsewhere. As a result, the ISI has greatly increased the role it plays among a wide variety of groups, from Afghan refugees in the northwest frontier region to Islamist political parties in Pakistan proper and the mujahideen themselves-who, over the years, have sold, bartered, and stashed away large quantities of weapons and narcotics (Kartha)

Pakistani intelligence services fund their operations through narcotics sales in the West. They are able to generate large amounts of revenue that not only fund these legitimate actions but fund global Jihad in the conflict between India and Pakistan over the area of Kashmir. Afghan war lords and terrorist organizations also profit economically from Western consumption of Heroin.

Economic Flow Char

Post 9/11, the United States and Coalition forces have used warlords to isolate and eliminate al Qaeda. However, using these warlords to the advantage of military forces in the country carries a heavy price.

Tribal warlords use the proceeds from poppy production within their area of control to…maintain their power base through weapons acquisitions. Similarly, remnants of the Taliban are using their drug profits to acquire weapons and attempt to reestablish power in the southern regions of Afghanistan. They are also using opium as a means to retaliate against the Untied States (Hueg 2004).

Afghan war lords, Taliban members, and al Qaeda acquire weapons through an extensive black market trade in the Southeast Asian region. Afghanistan is feeding the global illicit arms trade in the region because it continually draws in more weapons and mujahidin (holy warriors or fighters) than its neighboring countries. Narcotics production in Afghanistan leads to the “so-called weapons and drugs-nexus” (Kartha). Regional war lords maintain their power through coercion and force. Afghan farmers (as stated above) are, sometimes, forced to grow poppy by war lords. In turn war lords fund their weapons caches through drug money provided to them through global drug dealers. Large weapons caches and a seemingly endless supply of cash enable these regional powerhouses to maintain their power grip causing instability in Afghanistan and throughout the world. Weapons and cash also allow war lords to recruit other mujahidin. They are able to pay them competitive wages to protect the areas that they control. Weapons and finances could enable warlords to advance their power grip outside their region. This could result in regional conflicts between opposing tribal leaders, as well as a global conflict with neighboring countries and terrorist actions. Tribal war lords not only maintain power through coercive force but through bribing leaders throughout all levels of government.

Afghan government officials, throughout all levels of government, are contributing to the drug trade through taking bribes. High ranking government officials are thought to be participating in drug trafficking. At the very least the bribes are causing them to turn a blind eye to what is happening in their region. “Western aid officials and several European diplomats named the same high-ranking politicians and officials, including one with close links to Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President, as drug lords” (Harnden 2006). Simply turning a blind eye to the drug trade in Afghanistan would be an underestimate of what is actually happening throughout the spectrum. In reality, several officials are actually drug traffickers themselves. They provide the logistics for their staff to carry out narcotics trafficking throughout Afghanistan.

Abdul Karim Brahowie, Afghanistan's minister of tribal and frontier affairs, says that the government has become so full of drug smugglers that cabinet meetings have become a farce. "Sometimes the people who complain the loudest about theft are thieves themselves," he says (Baldauf and Bowers 2005).

While there are provincial leaders who are legitimately cracking down on poppy production some are only conducting anti-narcotics operations to line their own pockets. It makes logical sense to put your competitor out of business. The fewer people competing for poppy supply, the more money an individual will make. While this may eliminate a substantial amount of drug traffickers from the region, it does not eliminate the supply of heroin introduced to the global drug market.

Corruption in the government, due to narco-dollars, has limited the eradication effort within Afghanistan. Provincial leaders receiving millions of dollars yearly have no reason to stamp out poppy production. They also have no reason to provide Afghan farmers with economic incentives to grow alternative crops. Corrupt leaders fuel the global heroin market because it creates a demand for poppy production. The full outline of this section is outlined in chart number three in the appendix in order to understand the section revolving around the drug lords and terrorist groups. The next section will revolve around engagement by the United States Military and NATO forces.

Warlords and Terrorists Flow
Sources:

Sanderson, Thomas N. 2004. “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines.” SAIS Review XXIV(1).
Milliken David. 2007. Washington (AFP).
Kartha, Tara, “Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arms in South Asia.”
Lt. Col. Hueg, Thomas H. 2004. “Afghanistan and Opium: Breaking the Habit.” U.S. Army War College.
Baldauf, Scott, and Faye Bowers. 2007. “Afghanistan Riddled With Drug Ties.” The Christian Science Monitor.
Harnden, Tobel. 2006. “Drug Trade ‘Reaches to Afghan Cabinet.’” Telegraph United Kingdom.

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism V

The Drug-Terrorism Cycle:

War lords and terrorist organizations, providing security, and coercing farmers to grow poppy in Afghanistan are fueling the drug-terror cycle. The United States Military and coalition forces also affect the drug-terror cycle. The cycle is part economic and part military. Governments are contributing to the cycle as well as individuals. Depicted in chart number one in the Appendix is a flow chart that outlines the drug-terrorism cycle. This flow chart will be thoroughly explained throughout the next section and will portray the problem Afghanistan faces in its future war against terrorism and narcotics. There are two separate parts to this flow chart. It will be broken down into two sections throughout this segment. A simpler chart will be provided at the end of each section that will provide information that is more easily interpreted.


The Drug Terrorism Cycle Flow

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism IV

Rise in Poppy Production 2006:

Afghanistan increased its production of poppy in 2006 and is expected to increase its production in 2007 as well. There are several reasons farmers choose to grow the poppy plant instead of wheat or rice (other major cash crops grown in Afghanistan). First farmers earn much higher wages if they grow poppy. Second, the drug trade is driving farmers to grow poppy under duress from drug traffickers and war lords trying to gain more resources. Third, farmers tell United Nations surveyors that they are able to buy luxury goods, such as televisions in addition to supporting their families, by growing poppy. Farmers growing poppy in Afghanistan contribute up to 70 percent of the worlds illicitly used opium. This not only poisons the public but contributes to tribal war lords, terrorist organizations, and the ousted Taliban government.

Farmers, on a whole, are able to earn 10 times the amount of money growing poppy as they can grow wheat. Wheat is the second leading cash crop grown in Afghanistan and does not bring in nearly the amount of money needed by poor Afghani farmers. “According to United Nations estimates, Afghan farmers can earn about $5,200 from an acre of opium, compared to $121 from an acre of wheat” (Hueg 2004). Farmers have no choice, if they want to provide the best lives for their families; they must grow poppy instead of other crops. While farmers are able to provide necessary items for their families through poppy production they are also able to buy luxury items with the extra income they earn. United Nations surveys list that being able to buy televisions and radios for their enjoyment are high up on the list of why farmers in Afghanistan grow poppy.

During the Cold War the United States supplied the Mujahidin with money and weapons. This source of income allowed Osama bin Laden and other leaders within the Afghan uprising to maintain their fight against the Soviet Union. Now tribal warlords are able to collect millions of dollars by trafficking opium. Once the al Qaeda threat is fully eliminated from Afghanistan, there will be a new form of terrorism. Narco-terrorism, much the same as it exists in Columbia, may be the result of US actions taking place in Afghanistan.

Sources:

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Hueg. (2004). “Afghanistan and Opium: Breaking the Habit.” United States Army War College.

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism III

Afghanistan Regains Largest Growth of Poppy Post United States Military Invasion:

Post US invasion Afghanistan has, once again, re-claimed the top position of poppy production. Afghanistan produces up to 90 percent of the worlds illicit opium supply. Most of this product is distributed to Europe and South East Asia, but some ends up in the United States. The Taliban cracked down on poppy production in the years 2000 and 2001, which nearly eliminated poppy growth in Afghanistan. Afghanistan poppy production went down 99 percent after this crackdown. The crackdown was forced economically, militarily, and socially. Post intervention of the Taliban regime; Afghanistan regained normal levels of poppy production.

Poppy elimination was also enforced through military measures. The Taliban and their military and law enforcement officers enforced elimination by destroying poppy plants. Farmers caught growing poppy by the Afghani police were arrested. Their punishment was the destruction of their poppy plant and a two year, or more, jail term. Poppy eradication led to a significant drop in the poppy yield and heroin use. “Globally the net result of the intervention produced an estimated 35% reduction in poppy cultivation and a 65% reduction in the potential illicit heroin supply from harvests in 2001” (Farrell, Thorne 2004). The aggressive law enforcement tactics were the main reasons poppy was nearly eradicated in Afghanistan. Religiously, the production of harmful drugs is forbidden by Islamic law.

The Taliban also declared a fatwa that growing poppy does not follow Sharia, Islamic law. “Some violators were paraded through the streets with blackened faces carrying several heavy sacks of heroin or wearing poppies while a ‘town crier’ informed the village of the fatwa violation” (Farrell, Thorne 2004) Humiliation and shame are detrimental to the reputations of people in the Muslim world. This type of community isolation would cause a decrease in the poppy production. Afghani farmers were frightened from the humiliation they would cause themselves and their families for growing poppy. However, the economic gains farmers would receive from a successful poppy harvest, sometimes, outweighed the shame and humiliation of being arrested for illicit poppy production.

These restrictions nearly eliminated the growth of poppy in Afghanistan. Some of the tactics were brutal, but illicit opium production fell dramatically in 2001. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the United States focused the majority of their attention on al Qaeda and are currently ignoring the drug lords. Opium is the driving force that is destabilizing Afghanistan. It is isolating the Karzai government, and providing tribal war lords power in their communities. Afghanistan has now surpassed its previous record in poppy production. Poppy production is expected to rise in 2007 and every year for the foreseeable future.

Sources:

Farrell, Graham, and John Thorne. 2004. “Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: An Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan.” International Journal of Drug Policy 16(2005).

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism

Russia Invades Afghanistan and Creates a New Narco-State:

Russian forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan in December of 1979. Prior to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan the country did not produce large amounts of opium. Surrounding countries such as Iran and Turkey were major producers of this drug. Jihad ensued in this country for the next twenty years. Mujahidin flocked to Afghanistan and is where many modern-day al Qaeda leaders trained to become the successful terrorists they are today. In order to combat the mujahidin, Russian military personnel destroyed legitimate agriculture that grew in Afghanistan. The consequences which arose out of these actions were a boom in the growth of poppy and a steady flow of resources to the mujahidin taking up arms against the Russian occupiers.

Afghan farmers were put in a predicament because of the destruction of their legitimate crops during the Russian occupation. “Unlike many other countries in the region, Afghanistan did not have much of an ‘opium culture’” (UNODC 2003). They were forced to turn to poppy as an alternative plant that would not be destroyed by the Russians. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan “decimated” the legitimate agricultural economy in Afghanistan (Farrell and Thorne 2004). The Russians were trying to starve the mujahidin and the Afghan population into surrendering. As a result food supply dropped dramatically in the country. A vacuum ensued in the southwest Asian opium economy because of crackdowns by neighboring countries. Afghan farmers took advantage of this situation and “turned to subsistence farming of the opium poppy” (Farrell and Thorne 2004). Not only did the illicit opium market find a supplier, the mujahidin fighting against the Russians filled their financial void by using the drug trade to obtain weapons.

In recent history opium production has played a large role in illicit arms sales for the mujahidin, warlords, and terrorist organizations. Even during the 1980s a large sum of cash was produced to provide weapons for the struggle against the Russian occupiers. “There were indications that the mujahidin were using the production and sale of opium to finance some weapons needs” (UNODC 2003). Subsequently, the United States, in particular the Central Intelligence Agency, was another means of funding for the mujahidin’s purchasing of weapons. Opium is highly important to the global arms trade especially in Afghanistan. During the Russian invasion “Opium was one of the only commodities which could generate enough income for large scale arms purchases” (UNODC 2003). Mujahidin and tribal warlords leading the resistance against the Russians found an efficient means to combat the occupation forces. The ultimate defeat of the Russians was caused by their own hands. While a weak communist economy produced the retreat of occupying Soviet forces and its fall from superpowerdom, the Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union played a small factor in the ultimate destruction of the Soviet empire.

The United States and NATO forces have made similar mistakes that the Russians made in their invasion of Afghanistan. Illicit poppy production sustains the ability of al Qaeda to raise funds for future terrorist attacks and allows tribal warlords to recruit new mujahidin. Russia made the mistake by eradicating the wrong crop. They eradicated legitimate agriculture instead of illicit drug supplies. Throughout the rest of this project there will be some similar mistakes made by coalition forces and the Russians. Those mistakes will be displayed below.

Sources:

Farrell, Graham, and John Thorne. 2004. “Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: An Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan.” International Journal of Drug Policy 16(2005).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2003). The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem.

The Drug-Terror Cycle: How Afghanistan Poppy Production Fuels Global Terrorism

Introduction:

The United States is one of the leading global heroin markets in the world. “It is estimated that Americans have consumed from between 11 to 14 metric tons of heroin per year since 1993” (Bruen, Johnston, Rhodaes, Layne, and Kiling 2002). Heroin is one of the less significant used drugs in the United States as compared to marijuana and cocaine, but it is extremely toxic to the body and can surely cause death. There are an estimated 1.6 million or more Heroin users in the United States. Around 600,000 of these users were occasional users and around one million were hardcore users of this drug (see Rhodes, Layne, Bruen, Johnston and Bacchetti 2001). Users spend billions of dollars per year on heroin, which is funding the global Jihad in Afghanistan and elsewhere throughout the world. It is estimated that American heroin users spend between $39 and $79 billion per year. The bulk of the product enters the United States from Central America and Mexico, but there is some that enters the US from Southeast Asia, mainly Afghanistan.

Asian Heroin, especially Southeast Asian heroin, does not make up a significant amount of heroin found in the United States. However, there are minimal amounts that do reach our borders from Afghanistan and other Southeast Asian countries. The Northeast United States is especially affected by the influx of heroin produced from Afghan poppy production. “Although Asian heroin comprises less than 10 percent of the total flow, it accounts for over a quarter of the flow through the Northeast” (Bruen et al 2002). Most Afghan heroin is being distributed throughout the major cities in the Northeastern part of the United States.

Due to large and porous borders, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other law enforcement agencies have been ineffective in limiting the drug flow into the United States. In the year 2000 only 10 percent of the heroin that entered, or was intended to enter, the US was seized (see Bruen et al 2002). Because seizures are not taking place drug runners see the United States as a lucrative opportunity to make money. This fuels the global drug trade and contributes to the struggle against our soldiers in Afghanistan.

Percent of Heroin Ceased by United States Law Enforcement Agencies

Import Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Northeast US 5% 8% 7% 5% 10%
Southeast US 6% 8% 6% 5% 6%
Texas Plus 2% 3% 3% 4% 4%
California Plus Rest of US 2% 3% 2% 1% 4%
Rest of US 6% 8% 10% 6% 11%
National Total 4% 7% 5% 4% 6% Source Estimation of Heroin Availability 1996-2000. Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Afghanistan, post United States military invasion in 2001, has, once again, become the world leader in poppy production. Illicit Poppy production produces narcotics such as Heroin that is distributed throughout the world. Not only does the poppy plant poison society through drug addictions, it funds terrorism, war lords, and the former oppressive government of Afghanistan, the Taliban. Poppy production and the entities it supports may provide an extremely dangerous and unstable Afghanistan. An unstable Afghanistan may provide for a dangerous reality for the United States Military, Coalition forces, and NATO forces stationed in and around Afghanistan. This strategic intelligence analysis will provide information and the global consequences that will result in higher poppy production in Afghanistan. Finally, the analysis will provide recommendations to help decrease, and hopefully eliminate poppy production in Afghanistan.

Heroin in Afghanistan:

Year Era Comment
1979 Soviet Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a rise in poppy production because
the invading army eradicated the food agriculture industry to starve the
mujahidin
1997 Taliban Afghanistan is becoming the global leader in poppy production because of
Turkish and Iranian Bans
2001 Taliban The Taliban instituted a strict ban on poppy production bringing its
Afghanistan’s production of illicit poppy down by 99 percent
2001 GWOT Global War on Terrorism begins with the Invasion of Afghanistan and
Operation Enduring Freedom. Poppy Production rises dramatically the
following year.
2006 NATO Afghanistan is the leading producer in illicit poppy once again and
contributes around 90 percent of the worlds opium supply.
2007 NATO Afghanistan is expected to boost its poppy production in the coming year.

Although not in large amounts, Poppy production has deep roots in Afghanistan. Its low lying valley regions provide fertile ground conducive to growing poppy. This production has been traced back to the 18th century, but, most certainly, can be traced to the mid 1920s. In 1974 Afghanistan was listed as a country in dire need of interdiction in its poppy production. Throughout that time Afghan farmers were aggressively growing poppy as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey “enforced bans on their poppy production” (Farrell 2004). In 2001 the Taliban claimed that growing poppy was un-Islamic and enforced its policy by fiercely punishing poppy growers. The ban caused an extreme drop in the worlds poppy production.

Sources:

Bruen, Ann-Marie, Patrick Johnson, William Rhodes, Mary Layne, and Ryan King. (2002).
“Estimation of Heroin Availability 1996 – 2000” Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Farrell, Graham, and John Thorne. (2004). “Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: An Evaluation
of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan.”
International Journal of Drug Policy 16(2005).
Rhodes, W., Layne, M., Bruen, A., Johnston, P., and Becchetti, L. (2001). What America’s users
Spend on Illegal Drugs 1988 – 2000. Report prepared for the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. Abt Associates Inc., December 2001.